

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**Routing Slip**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS	X			
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
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SUSPENSE		17 September Date			

Remarks:

Recommendation, please, to DCI.

Executive Secretary
13 September 1982
Date

3637 (10-81)

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: N 1021
9 September 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures; Follow-on Actions

1. Reference is made to the NFIB discussions on 8 June 1982 relative to unauthorized disclosures of sensitive compartmented information.

2. As a supplementary action and follow-up to the timely and very welcome actions you have taken to stem the damaging flow of disclosures, I have suggested, through our representative to the DCI Security Committee, two new initiatives which may prove useful: one is a plan to accomplish better briefing and indoctrination for high-level officials with sensitive access; and second is a letter to be provided to each SCI-cleared individual by his Senior Official of the Intelligence Community alerting them to the potential for damage in unauthorized disclosures and putting them on notice of the legal and administrative actions which can be invoked for the unauthorized disclosure of SCI information. A copy of a proposed letter is attached.

3. I commend these initiatives to you for support and would appreciate your scheduling this important subject for discussion at an early NFIB meeting.

ROBERT E. RICH
Deputy Director

Encl:
a/s

Copy Furnished:
NFIB Members



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Serial:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD MEMBERS

SUBJECT: Security Advisory to Recipients of United States Signals Intelligence (U)

(U) In furtherance of the NFIB decision of 8 June, the following letter has been drafted for Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs) to provide to SIGINT recipients. Each organization may modify the letter as appropriate; the principal point is the expression of concern about recent disclosures, and the reaffirmation of the sensitivity and fragility of Signals Intelligence sources and methods.

"(S-CCO) You are being provided this letter by reason of your access to, and actual receipt of, classified Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) produced by the National Security Agency (NSA) through its interception and decipherment of communications of foreign intelligence interest. You may receive such SIGINT either directly from NSA or in intelligence dissemination by other agencies. Every recipient of this letter has been cleared for access to TOP SECRET CODEWORD information; every recipient receives highly classified foreign intelligence, including SIGINT; and the United States has placed the highest confidence and trust possible in every recipient. I regret to have to advise you that some recipients appear to have violated this trust by improperly disclosing to persons in the news media information revealing current, successful United States SIGINT activities, including, in one instance, an actual, deciphered message text.

"(S-CCO) It is important that all users understand the fragility of SIGINT, the ease with which countermeasures can be devised, and the serious consequences which can follow from such disclosures, even inadvertent or well-intentioned disclosures which may seem innocuous. Neither the text of messages nor the fact of decryption needs to be disclosed in order to endanger NSA's abilities; virtually any release of SIGINT-derived or related information, including even sanitized disclosures, permits foreign states to draw conclusions concerning our targets, capabilities, and techniques. 25X1

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[REDACTED] without going into detail, my conclusion is that the leaks have endangered the United States SIGINT system, a priceless national resource, and have raised fundamental questions about our continued ability to collect and disseminate SIGINT.

"(U) While the security of SIGINT is protected by various statutes, (18 U.S.C. §793 and 798 among them) the utility of other measures, including

Enclosure

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administrative sanctions, should not be ignored. The basic protection for SIGINT, however, must be the prudence and legality of those persons provided access. The purpose of this letter is to remind you of these facts.

"(U) I am taking this extreme measure in order to stress the unprecedented seriousness of my concern. I request that each recipient of this memorandum ensure distribution to all individuals within their respective organizations who receive signals intelligence, in any form, with the added requirement that such individuals acknowledge by signature their understanding of the concerns expressed herein."

(Organization SOIC)

(Signature of SIGINT Recipient)

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